Misc SCRAM code cleanups.

* Move computation of SaltedPassword to a separate function from
  scram_ClientOrServerKey(). This saves a lot of cycles in libpq, by
  computing SaltedPassword only once per authentication. (Computing
  SaltedPassword is expensive by design.)

* Split scram_ClientOrServerKey() into two functions. Improves
  readability, by making the calling code less verbose.

* Rename "server proof" to "server signature", to better match the
  nomenclature used in RFC 5802.

* Rename SCRAM_SALT_LEN to SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, to make it more clear
  that the salt can be of any length, and the constant only specifies how
  long a salt we use when we generate a new verifier. Also rename
  SCRAM_ITERATIONS_DEFAULT to SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, for consistency.

These things caught my eye while working on other upcoming changes.

Author: hlinnaka

src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c

@@ -396,7 +396,8 @@ scram_build_verifier(const char *username, const char *password,
 {
 	char	   *prep_password = NULL;
 	pg_saslprep_rc rc;
-	char		saltbuf[SCRAM_SALT_LEN];
+	char		saltbuf[SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN];
+	uint8		salted_password[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
 	uint8		keybuf[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
 	char	   *encoded_salt;
 	char	   *encoded_storedkey;
@@ -414,24 +415,25 @@ scram_build_verifier(const char *username, const char *password,
 		password = (const char *) prep_password;
 
 	if (iterations <= 0)
-		iterations = SCRAM_ITERATIONS_DEFAULT;
+		iterations = SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS;
 
 	/* Generate salt, and encode it in base64 */
-	if (!pg_backend_random(saltbuf, SCRAM_SALT_LEN))
+	if (!pg_backend_random(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN))
 	{
 		ereport(LOG,
 				(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
 				 errmsg("could not generate random salt")));
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
-	encoded_salt = palloc(pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_SALT_LEN) + 1);
-	encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(saltbuf, SCRAM_SALT_LEN, encoded_salt);
+	encoded_salt = palloc(pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN) + 1);
+	encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, encoded_salt);
 	encoded_salt[encoded_len] = '\0';
 
 	/* Calculate StoredKey, and encode it in base64 */
-	scram_ClientOrServerKey(password, saltbuf, SCRAM_SALT_LEN,
-							iterations, SCRAM_CLIENT_KEY_NAME, keybuf);
+	scram_SaltedPassword(password, saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN,
+						 iterations, salted_password);
+	scram_ClientKey(salted_password, keybuf);
 	scram_H(keybuf, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, keybuf);		/* StoredKey */
 
 	encoded_storedkey = palloc(pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_KEY_LEN) + 1);
@@ -440,8 +442,7 @@ scram_build_verifier(const char *username, const char *password,
 	encoded_storedkey[encoded_len] = '\0';
 
 	/* And same for ServerKey */
-	scram_ClientOrServerKey(password, saltbuf, SCRAM_SALT_LEN, iterations,
-							SCRAM_SERVER_KEY_NAME, keybuf);
+	scram_ServerKey(salted_password, keybuf);
 
 	encoded_serverkey = palloc(pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_KEY_LEN) + 1);
 	encoded_len = pg_b64_encode((const char *) keybuf, SCRAM_KEY_LEN,
@@ -473,6 +474,7 @@ scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password,
 	char	   *salt;
 	int			saltlen;
 	int			iterations;
+	uint8		salted_password[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
 	uint8		stored_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
 	uint8		server_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
 	uint8		computed_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
@@ -502,9 +504,9 @@ scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password,
 	if (rc == SASLPREP_SUCCESS)
 		password = prep_password;
 
-	/* Compute Server key based on the user-supplied plaintext password */
-	scram_ClientOrServerKey(password, salt, saltlen, iterations,
-							SCRAM_SERVER_KEY_NAME, computed_key);
+	/* Compute Server Key based on the user-supplied plaintext password */
+	scram_SaltedPassword(password, salt, saltlen, iterations, salted_password);
+	scram_ServerKey(salted_password, computed_key);
 
 	if (prep_password)
 		pfree(prep_password);
@@ -630,12 +632,12 @@ mock_scram_verifier(const char *username, int *iterations, char **salt,
 	/* Generate deterministic salt */
 	raw_salt = scram_MockSalt(username);
 
-	encoded_salt = (char *) palloc(pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_SALT_LEN) + 1);
-	encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(raw_salt, SCRAM_SALT_LEN, encoded_salt);
+	encoded_salt = (char *) palloc(pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN) + 1);
+	encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(raw_salt, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, encoded_salt);
 	encoded_salt[encoded_len] = '\0';
 
 	*salt = encoded_salt;
-	*iterations = SCRAM_ITERATIONS_DEFAULT;
+	*iterations = SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS;
 
 	/* StoredKey and ServerKey are not used in a doomed authentication */
 	memset(stored_key, 0, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
@@ -1179,7 +1181,7 @@ build_server_final_message(scram_state *state)
 /*
  * Determinisitcally generate salt for mock authentication, using a SHA256
  * hash based on the username and a cluster-level secret key.  Returns a
- * pointer to a static buffer of size SCRAM_SALT_LEN.
+ * pointer to a static buffer of size SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN.
  */
 static char *
 scram_MockSalt(const char *username)
@@ -1194,7 +1196,7 @@ scram_MockSalt(const char *username)
 	 * not larger the SHA256 digest length. If the salt is smaller, the caller
 	 * will just ignore the extra data))
 	 */
-	StaticAssertStmt(PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH >= SCRAM_SALT_LEN,
+	StaticAssertStmt(PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH >= SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN,
 					 "salt length greater than SHA256 digest length");
 
 	pg_sha256_init(&ctx);

src/common/scram-common.c

@@ -98,23 +98,31 @@ scram_HMAC_final(uint8 *result, scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx)
 }
 
 /*
- * Iterate hash calculation of HMAC entry using given salt.
- * scram_Hi() is essentially PBKDF2 (see RFC2898) with HMAC() as the
- * pseudorandom function.
+ * Calculate SaltedPassword.
+ *
+ * The password should already be normalized by SASLprep.
  */
-static void
-scram_Hi(const char *str, const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations, uint8 *result)
+void
+scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password,
+					 const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations,
+					 uint8 *result)
 {
-	int			str_len = strlen(str);
+	int			password_len = strlen(password);
 	uint32		one = htonl(1);
 	int			i,
 				j;
 	uint8		Ui[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
 	uint8		Ui_prev[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
 	scram_HMAC_ctx hmac_ctx;
 
+	/*
+	 * Iterate hash calculation of HMAC entry using given salt.  This is
+	 * essentially PBKDF2 (see RFC2898) with HMAC() as the pseudorandom
+	 * function.
+	 */
+
 	/* First iteration */
-	scram_HMAC_init(&hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) str, str_len);
+	scram_HMAC_init(&hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) password, password_len);
 	scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, salt, saltlen);
 	scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, (char *) &one, sizeof(uint32));
 	scram_HMAC_final(Ui_prev, &hmac_ctx);
@@ -123,7 +131,7 @@ scram_Hi(const char *str, const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations, uint8 *
 	/* Subsequent iterations */
 	for (i = 2; i <= iterations; i++)
 	{
-		scram_HMAC_init(&hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) str, str_len);
+		scram_HMAC_init(&hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) password, password_len);
 		scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, (const char *) Ui_prev, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
 		scram_HMAC_final(Ui, &hmac_ctx);
 		for (j = 0; j < SCRAM_KEY_LEN; j++)
@@ -148,20 +156,27 @@ scram_H(const uint8 *input, int len, uint8 *result)
 }
 
 /*
- * Calculate ClientKey or ServerKey.
- *
- * The password should already be normalized by SASLprep.
+ * Calculate ClientKey.
  */
 void
-scram_ClientOrServerKey(const char *password,
-						const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations,
-						const char *keystr, uint8 *result)
+scram_ClientKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result)
+{
+	scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
+
+	scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, salted_password, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, "Client Key", strlen("Client Key"));
+	scram_HMAC_final(result, &ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate ServerKey.
+ */
+void
+scram_ServerKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result)
 {
-	uint8		keybuf[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
 	scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
 
-	scram_Hi(password, salt, saltlen, iterations, keybuf);
-	scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, keybuf, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
-	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, keystr, strlen(keystr));
+	scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, salted_password, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, "Server Key", strlen("Server Key"));
 	scram_HMAC_final(result, &ctx);
 }

src/include/common/scram-common.h

@@ -29,14 +29,10 @@
 #define SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN			10
 
 /* length of salt when generating new verifiers */
-#define SCRAM_SALT_LEN				10
+#define SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN		10
 
 /* default number of iterations when generating verifier */
-#define SCRAM_ITERATIONS_DEFAULT	4096
-
-/* Base name of keys used for proof generation */
-#define SCRAM_SERVER_KEY_NAME "Server Key"
-#define SCRAM_CLIENT_KEY_NAME "Client Key"
+#define SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS	4096
 
 /*
  * Context data for HMAC used in SCRAM authentication.
@@ -51,9 +47,10 @@ extern void scram_HMAC_init(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, int keylen);
 extern void scram_HMAC_update(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const char *str, int slen);
 extern void scram_HMAC_final(uint8 *result, scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx);
 
+extern void scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password, const char *salt,
+						int saltlen, int iterations, uint8 *result);
 extern void scram_H(const uint8 *str, int len, uint8 *result);
-extern void scram_ClientOrServerKey(const char *password, const char *salt,
-						int saltlen, int iterations,
-						const char *keystr, uint8 *result);
+extern void scram_ClientKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result);
+extern void scram_ServerKey(const uint8 *salted_password, uint8 *result);
 
 #endif   /* SCRAM_COMMON_H */

src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ typedef struct
 	char	   *password;
 
 	/* We construct these */
+	uint8		SaltedPassword[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
 	char	   *client_nonce;
 	char	   *client_first_message_bare;
 	char	   *client_final_message_without_proof;
@@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ typedef struct
 
 	/* These come from the server-final message */
 	char	   *server_final_message;
-	char		ServerProof[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+	char		ServerSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
 } fe_scram_state;
 
 static bool read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input,
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ static char *build_client_first_message(fe_scram_state *state,
 						   PQExpBuffer errormessage);
 static char *build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state,
 						   PQExpBuffer errormessage);
-static bool verify_server_proof(fe_scram_state *state);
+static bool verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state);
 static void calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
 					   const char *client_final_message_without_proof,
 					   uint8 *result);
@@ -216,12 +217,12 @@ pg_fe_scram_exchange(void *opaq, char *input, int inputlen,
 				goto error;
 
 			/*
-			 * Verify server proof, to make sure we're talking to the genuine
-			 * server.  XXX: A fake server could simply not require
+			 * Verify server signature, to make sure we're talking to the
+			 * genuine server.  XXX: A fake server could simply not require
 			 * authentication, though.  There is currently no option in libpq
 			 * to reject a connection, if SCRAM authentication did not happen.
 			 */
-			if (verify_server_proof(state))
+			if (verify_server_signature(state))
 				*success = true;
 			else
 			{
@@ -486,12 +487,11 @@ read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input,
  * Read the final exchange message coming from the server.
  */
 static bool
-read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state,
-						  char *input,
+read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input,
 						  PQExpBuffer errormessage)
 {
-	char	   *encoded_server_proof;
-	int			server_proof_len;
+	char	   *encoded_server_signature;
+	int			server_signature_len;
 
 	state->server_final_message = strdup(input);
 	if (!state->server_final_message)
@@ -513,8 +513,8 @@ read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state,
 	}
 
 	/* Parse the message. */
-	encoded_server_proof = read_attr_value(&input, 'v', errormessage);
-	if (encoded_server_proof == NULL)
+	encoded_server_signature = read_attr_value(&input, 'v', errormessage);
+	if (encoded_server_signature == NULL)
 	{
 		/* read_attr_value() has generated an error message */
 		return false;
@@ -524,13 +524,13 @@ read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state,
 		printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
 						  libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (garbage at end of server-final-message)\n"));
 
-	server_proof_len = pg_b64_decode(encoded_server_proof,
-									 strlen(encoded_server_proof),
-									 state->ServerProof);
-	if (server_proof_len != SCRAM_KEY_LEN)
+	server_signature_len = pg_b64_decode(encoded_server_signature,
+										 strlen(encoded_server_signature),
+										 state->ServerSignature);
+	if (server_signature_len != SCRAM_KEY_LEN)
 	{
 		printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
-		  libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (invalid server proof)\n"));
+						  libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (invalid server signature)\n"));
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -552,8 +552,14 @@ calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
 	int			i;
 	scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
 
-	scram_ClientOrServerKey(state->password, state->salt, state->saltlen,
-						state->iterations, SCRAM_CLIENT_KEY_NAME, ClientKey);
+	/*
+	 * Calculate SaltedPassword, and store it in 'state' so that we can reuse
+	 * it later in verify_server_signature.
+	 */
+	scram_SaltedPassword(state->password, state->salt, state->saltlen,
+						 state->iterations, state->SaltedPassword);
+
+	scram_ClientKey(state->SaltedPassword, ClientKey);
 	scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, StoredKey);
 
 	scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
@@ -575,19 +581,17 @@ calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
 }
 
 /*
- * Validate the server proof, received as part of the final exchange message
- * received from the server.
+ * Validate the server signature, received as part of the final exchange
+ * message received from the server.
  */
 static bool
-verify_server_proof(fe_scram_state *state)
+verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state)
 {
-	uint8		ServerSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+	uint8		expected_ServerSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
 	uint8		ServerKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
 	scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
 
-	scram_ClientOrServerKey(state->password, state->salt, state->saltlen,
-							state->iterations, SCRAM_SERVER_KEY_NAME,
-							ServerKey);
+	scram_ServerKey(state->SaltedPassword, ServerKey);
 
 	/* calculate ServerSignature */
 	scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, ServerKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
@@ -602,9 +606,9 @@ verify_server_proof(fe_scram_state *state)
 	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
 					  state->client_final_message_without_proof,
 					  strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof));
-	scram_HMAC_final(ServerSignature, &ctx);
+	scram_HMAC_final(expected_ServerSignature, &ctx);
 
-	if (memcmp(ServerSignature, state->ServerProof, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) != 0)
+	if (memcmp(expected_ServerSignature, state->ServerSignature, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) != 0)
 		return false;
 
 	return true;